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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did

the

trial and appellate courts err

in holding

appellants Gardner and Hernandez personally liable on the contract between Foreign Auto Works, Inc., Poggio and Dinero Services, Inc., a corporation, without any evidence that Dinero was
Hernandez and Gardner's alter ego?
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
This

Petition

seeks

review

of

the

Utah

Court

of

Appeals' Opinion (for publication) dated January 2, 1990 (hereinafter "Opinion").
JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant
to Utah Code Ann^ S 78-2-2(3)(a) and Rule 42 of the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court. This Petition has been timely filed under
Rule 45 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court in that the Court
of Appeals' Opinion was issued on January 2, 1990, appellants
Gardner and Hernandez filed a Petition for Rehearing on January
16, 1990, pursuant to Rule 35(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals, and that petition was denied by the Court of Appeals
on January 29, 1990.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The disputes giving rise to this appeal all related to
the purchase and sale in 1979-80 of a Mazda and Fiat dealership
located in Orem, Utah.

At that time, the subject business, For-

eign Auto Works, was a corporation owned entirely by plaintiffs

Poggiof Ringwood and Francis.
purchase

Ringwood's

However, Poggio had a contract to

interest,

and

Francis1 interest, in the company.

subsequently

did

purchase

Because of a number of dis-

putes that arose, the sale transaction involved the execution of
four separate and distinct contractual agreements, each of which
was intended to supersede the preceding ones, over a period of
several months.
Plaintiff Ringwood originally sued Poggio, Francis and
Foreign Auto Works in the Fourth District Court for Utah County
on the promissory note that had been given in connection with the
purchase of Ringwood's shares in Foreign Auto Works.

That action

was dismissed on the basis that the note had been superseded by a
subsequent contract covering the same sale.

The ruling in that

case was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc. 671 P.2d 182 (Utah 1983).

Ringwood then

filed another action in Fourth District Court, against Poggio,
Francis and Foreign Auto Works, on the contract.

Hernandez and

Gardner were subsequently added as defendants, on the basis that
Ringwood was a third-party beneficiary of the first contractual
agreement between them and Poggio.
Poggio sued Hernandez and Gardner in a separate action,
attempting
which

to enforce the terms of a November, 1979 contract,

included a provision that Hernandez and Gardner assumed

Poggio's obligation to Ringwood.

Poggio amended his Complaint,

following a Motion to Dismiss by Hernandez and Gardner, to sue
Hernandez

and

Gardner

on

the

parties'

-2-

second

contract,

and

claimed that two subsequent contracts for the sale of the same
business to Dinero Services, Inc., entered in February and April,
1980, were invalid because of duress and lack of consideration.
The Poggio and Ringwood actions were then consolidated.
Both actions were tried to the court beginning on September 10, 1986.

During trial, Poggio's counsel for the first

time made an oral motion to assert a claim against Hernandez and
Gardner for failure to pay under the fourth and final contract,
dated April, 1980, which was actually between Foreign Auto Works,
Inc., Poggio and Dinero Services, Inc.

That motion was granted

by the court over the objections of Hernandez and Gardner's counsel.

Over a month later, Poggio amended his Complaint to include

such a cause of action.

Hernandez and Gardner, without waiving

their claim that they were not parties to that contract, counterclaimed for overpayment and for attorneys' fees, relying on the
terms of the same agreement.
The court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law on November 14, 1986, and final Judgment on June 4, 1987.
The court ruled against plaintiff Ringwood on his claims against
Hernandez and Gardner, finding

that the first contract, upon

which Ringwood relied, had been superseded.

The court found in

favor of Ringwood on his claims against Poggio, Francis and Foreign Auto Works, finding that those parties had failed to pay on
their contract to purchase Ringwood's stock.
against

Hernandez

and

Gardner

on

their

The court ruled

counterclaim

against

Poggio, and partially in favor of Poggio on his claim against

-3-

Hernandez and Gardner under the April, 1980 agreement.

With

respect to Poggio's earlier claims, the court found the April,
1980 agreement to be the operative one.
All
aspects

of

parties

moved

for

reconsideration

of

various

the judgment, and all post-judgment motions were

denied by the court on August 3, 1987. Each of the parties separately appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which transferred all
three appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals.

All three appeals

were then consolidated by the Court of Appeals, which issued its
Opinion, affirming in part and reversing in part the trial court,
on January 2, 1990.

By that Opinion, all issues on appeal were

affirmed, with the exception of the judgment obtained by Ringwood
against Poggio, which was reversed on the grounds that Ringwood1s
claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Gardner and

Hernandez petitioned for rehearing on the issue of their personal
liability, which petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on
January 29, 1990.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On November 27, 1979, Max Poggio entered into an

agreement (the "November Agreement") with Hugh Gardner and Tony
Hernandez in which it was agreed that Gardner Hernandez would

-4-

purchase all of the outstanding stock of Foreign Auto Works, Inc.
("FAW") from Poggio.
2.

(Ex. 3; Tr. I1 pp. 19-21).

The terms of the November Agreement

included a

payment by Gardner and Hernandez for Poggio1s covenant not to
compete, as well as a sale to Hernandez and Gardner of certain
real property located in Orem, Utah.

In addition, Hernandez and

Gardner agreed to assume Poggio's responsibilities to Richard
Ringwood arising from Poggio1s contract to purchase Ringwood's
15,000 shares of FAW stock.
3.

On

December

(Ex. 3, Tr, I. pp. 12-21).
29,

1979,

Poggio,

Gardner

and

Hernandez executed another contract (the "December Agreement"),
the terms of which were essentially identical to those of the
November Agreement, with the exception that the subsequent agreement eliminated the real property purchase.

(Ex. 4; Tr. I pp.

22-26).
4.
("Dinero"),

On February 8, 1980, FAW and Dinero Services, Inc.
a corporation, the stock

in which was owned by

Gardner and Hernandez, executed another agreement (the "February
Agreement").

The February Agreement changed the terms of the

1

Throughout this brief, references will be made to the multiple volumes of transcript from the trial court proceedings. "Tr.
I" refers to that portion of the transcript designated as "Transcript of September 10, 1986 Trial Proceedings." Similarly, "Tr.
II: refers to the Transcript of October 15, 1986 Trial Proceedings," "Tr. Ill" to "Abstracts from Transcript of Trial, Comprising the Testimony of the Witness Hugh Gardner," "Tr. IV" to
"Abstracts from Transcript of Trial, Comprising the Testimony of
the Witness Massimo C. Poggio," and "Tr. V" to "Transcript of
October 16, 1986 Trial Proceedings." "Ex. 3" refers to Exhibit 3
at trial. Other trial exhibits will be referenced similarly.
-5-

contract to eliminate the purchase of FAW stock, and provided
instead for purchase of essentially all of the company's assets,
Gardner and Hernandez were not named as parties to the February
Agreement.

(Ex. 5; Tr. I pp. 94-95).
5.

The February Agreement eliminated any assumption

of Poggio's outstanding liability to Ringwood.
6.

On April 14, 1980, Poggio, FAW and Dinero executed

a final agreement

(the "April Agreement11) with respect to the

sale and purchase of the assets of FAW.
Hernandez were not named parties.
7.

(Ex. 5).

Again, Gardner and
2

(Ex. 9,10; Tr. I pp. 49-50.)

Under the April Agreement, Dinero did not agree to

purchase any FAW stock, and did not agree to assume any liability
for Poggio's debt to Ringwood.
8.

(Ex. 9, 10).

On November 30, 1983, Poggio sued Hernandez and

Gardner for breach of the November Agreement. Dinero was not
named as a party.
9.

(Complaint).

On January 26, 1984, following defendants' Motion

to Dismiss, Poggio amended his Complaint to eliminate the claims
under the November Agreement, and to allege instead of a cause of
2

The April Agreement was submitted to the trial court in two
forms. Ex. 9 was a copy of the agreement from Poggio's records,
and Ex. 10 was a copy from Dinero's records. Exhibits 9 and 10
differ in only two material respects. Ex. 9 contains an unfilled
blank at 11 3(a), whereas Ex. 10 contains the figure $75,076.79 in
that space, which figure was initiated by Poggio. (Tr. I p. 50.)
In addition, there were different promissory notes attaches as
"Exhibit 4" to each agreement. Ex. 9's note was in the amount of
$80,000 and Exhibit 10's note was in the amount of $30,583.02.
(Tr. I pp. 49-58.) The court found that the evidence did not
support the inclusion of either note as a part of the April
Agreement. (Findings of Fact H 85(e).)
-6-

action under
named.

the December Agreement.

Again, Dinero was not

(Amended Complaint).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme

Court, this Court may grant review of a Court of Appeals' decision by writ of certiorari

"only when there are special and

important reasons therefor."
forth

in Rule

Of the character of reasons set

43 upon which

these appellants

rely,

is the

following:
•

• •

(3) When a panel of the Court of
Appeals has rendered a decision that has so
far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings or has so far
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court
as to call for an exercise of this court's
power of supervision;
•

« •

Appellants assert that the Court of Appeals in this matter, by
accepting "findings" of the trial court that were made without
presentation of any evidence at trial, has sanctioned such a
departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call

for the exercise of

this Court's power of

supervision.
Moreover, while the Court of Appeals applied the correct standard for piercing of the corporate veil in this State,
its application of that standard to the trial court's "findings"
evidences

a total

arguendo, that

lack of

the trial

reasoned

analysis, even assuming,

court could
-7-

legitimately make such

findings without presentation of evidence.

Indeed, the findings

upon which the Court of Appeals relied in affirming the trial
court's decision to pierce the corporate veil in this case in no
way satisfied the standard for piercing the corporate veil as it
is described by the Court of Appeals.
ARGUMENT
HERNANDEZ AND GARDNER WERE NOT PARTIES TO THE
APRIL AGREEMENT, AND CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE
FOR A BREACH OF ITS TERMS ABSENT A SHOWING
THAT DINERO SERVICES, INC. WAS IN FACT THEIR
ALTER EGO.
There

is no dispute that the parties to the April

Agreement, which the trial court found to be the controlling
agreement, were Dinero, FAW and Max Poggio.

There is likewise no

dispute that Dinero is, and was at the time of the agreement, a
valid Utah corporation, in which Gardner and Hernandez are shareholders.

(Tr. II p. 51; Tr. Ill pp. 2-3). Finally, there is no

dispute that four separate contracts were executed in connection
with the purchase and sale of FAW and that each of those agreements contain different terms, including different named parties.
Thus, Dinero is the named buyer in the last two agreements and
Gardner and Hernandez are not.

Why this change in parties was

made was never the subject of evidence at trial.
In this case, both the Court of Appeals and the trial
court found that the April Agreement was a valid contract that
superseded all prior agreements for the purchase and sale of FAW.
Neither Hernandez nor Gardner is a party to the April Agreement
in an individual capacity, and there was no evidence presented at
-8-

trial that would in any way support a
3
their alter ego.

finding that Dinero was

In its Opinion on this issue, the Court of Appeals recognized the standard applicable to attempts to hold individuals
liable for the obligations of corporations, which is as follows:
"Ordinarily, a corporation is regarded as a
separate and distinct legal entity from its
stockholders." This is true whether the corporation has many stockholders or only one.
Consequently, the corporate veil which protects stockholders from individual liability
will
only
be pierced
reluctantly
and
cautiously.
To disregard the corporate entity under the
equitable alter ego doctrine, two circumstances must be shown: (1) such a unity of
interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist, but the corporation
is, instead, the alter ego of one or a few
individuals; and (2) if observed, the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote
injustice, or result in an inequity.
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Opinion
at 14.

See also# Hansen v. Green River Group, 748 P.2d 1102

(Utah Ct. App. 1988).

3
The trial court apparently misperceived the arguments made
in connection with Hernandez and Gardner's Motion for Summary
Judgment, which were that the February and April Agreements
superceded the December Agreement since they involved the same
subject matter and essentially the same parties. Significantly,
this argument did not involve any concession by Gardner or
Hernandez that use of the corporate entity in the latter agreements was invalid, or that they could be held liable as individuals under the April Agreement. Nor is it evidence of an "intent"
that Gardner and Hernandez would be personally liable under an
agreement to which they were not parties. It certainly is not
evidence sufficient to satisfy the Colman test.
-9-

Poggio presented no evidence that would support a finding that the two-part test described in Colman had been satisfied.

In fact, Poggio never even asserted that Dinero was the

alter ego of Hernandez and Gardner.

Nor did the trial court make

any findings consistent with Colman.

Instead, the court simply

held, in conclusory fashion, that "Dinero Services, Inc. was not
intended by the parties to be the contracting party, but that
Gardner and Hernandez were the actual buyers [under the April
Agreement] and were obligated as such."
3(a)).

(Conclusions of Law f

Significantly, this conclusion was reached by the court

prior to any evidence having been presented, the court stating at
the beginning of the trial as follows:
As I understand the position, I don't think I
could come to any other conclusion, that they
expected they were all dealing with each
other as individuals. That's the way they
started out. Even though they talked about
the corporate structures, everyone felt that
they were dealing with each other.
And,
that's the position that I've taken with
respect to that.
(Tr. 1 pp. 6-7).
Indeed, the Court of Appeals even recognized that this
was the case, stating, "At the beginning of trial, the court
stated that Gardner and Hernandez were personally liable under
the April agreement and the trial proceeded with that ruling in
place."

Opinion at 14 (emphasis added).

The Court of Appeals'

Opinion goes on to cite the "findings" of the trial court, noting
that those findings were "supported by the evidence."

Id.

How-

ever, there was no evidence presented at trial on this issue, nor

-10-

were Gardner and Hernandez given any opportunity to present evidence to the contrary.
The trial court's conclusion, based apparently upon
arguments on the issue of whether the later agreements at issue
in fact superseded the prior two, is different from, and falls
far short of, what is necessary to hold Gardner and Hernandez
individually liable for the contractual obligations of Dinero.
It was both palpably unfair, and in conflict with clear Utah law,
for the court to ignore the corporate form without even a scintilla of

evidence presented

that such action was justified.

There was no evidence of a "unity of interest" sufficient to
eliminate the corporation's separate personality, nor was there
any evidence that recognition of the corporate entity would in
any way "sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or result in an
inequity."

These findings are necessary to justify individual

liability under the facts that were shown in this case.

The

trial court's conclusory finding of such liability flies in the
face of this State's policy of recognizing the validity of the
corporate form except under unusual and limited circumstances.
The decision to hold Gardner and Hernandez individually liable
under the April Agreement was therefore in error.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's finding of individual liability on
the part of appellants Gardner and Hernandez was not based upon
evidence of record and was therefore in error.

-11-

The Court of

Appeals' Opinion affirming

the trial court's finding on that

issue was likewise in error and should be reversed by this Court.
DATED this 2ff

day of February, 1990.

<&XL R./ANTCZAK

JULIA »C. ATTWOOD
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Appellants Gardner
and Hernandez
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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Richard W. Ringwood,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Foreign Auto Works, Inc. and
Howard R. Francis, Massimo C.
Poggio, Rebecca Jane Poggio,
Anthony Hernandez and Hugh
Gardner,
Defendants and Respondents,
Massimo "Max" Poggio and
Foreign Auto Works, Inc.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Hugh Gardner and Anthony R.
Hernandez,
Defendants.
Richard W. Ringwood,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

OPINION
(For Publication)
Case No. 870540-CA

Case No. 870541-CA

Foreign Auto Works, Inc. et
al.,
Defendants and Appellants
Massimo "Max* Poggio and
Foreign Auto Works, Inc.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Hugh Gardner and Anthony R.
Hernandez,
Defendants and Respondents,
Richard W. Ringwood,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Foreign Auto Works, Inc. et
al.,
Defendants and Respondents
Massimo "Max" Poggio and
Foreign Auto Works, Inc.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
Hugh Gardner and Anthony R.
Hernandez,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No. 870544-CA

App^

Fourth District/ Utah County
The Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen
Attorneys:

Dallas H. Young, Jr., Jerry Reynolds/ Provo, for
Appellant and Respondent Ringwood
Val R. Antczak/ Julia C. Attwood/ Salt Lake City,
for Appellants and Respondents Gardner &
Hernandez
Robert C. Fillerup, Orem/ for Appellant and
Respondent Francis
Lynn C. Harris, Jeril B. Wilson, Provo, for
Appellants and Respondents Poggio and Foreign
Auto Works

Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Orme.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
This appeal arises from the sale of Foreign Auto Works,
Inc. (FAW), an auto sales and service business. Richard W.
Ringwood (Ringwood), Howard R. Francis (Francis), and Rebecca
Jane and Massimo "Max* Poggio (Poggio) were the owners of all
the issued FAW stock. Ringwood agreed to sell his stock to
Poggio and Francis. Poggio subsequently bought Francis's stock
and sold FAW to Hugh Gardner (Gardner) and Anthony R. Hernandez
(Hernandez). Ringwood brought an action against Francis and
Poggio for breach of contract and against Hernandez and
Gardner, claiming to be a third party beneficiary of their
contract with Poggio. Poggio filed a separate action for
breach of contract against Gardner and Hernandez. The two
actions were consolidated and tried together. The court found
Francis and Poggio liable for breach of their agreement with
Ringwood, but dismissed Ringwood's claim against Hernandez and
Gardner. The court also rendered judgment for Poggio against
Gardner and Hernandez. Hernandez and Gardner's counterclaim
against Poggio and FAW was dismissed with prejudice. All
parties appealed.
FACTS
Ringwood, Francis, and Poggio were owners of all the FAW
issued stock, 50,000 shares. FAW was engaged in operating

O T r t C >t A

•C A t
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Mazda and Fiat franchises and selling parts for and repairing
Mazdas and Fiats.
In October 1978, the owners negotiated a sale of Ringwood's
15,000 shares to Francis and Poggio. This agreement was
formalized in a promissory note obligating FAW, Poggio, and
Francis to pay Ringwood $100,000 at a rate of at least $20,000
per year with interest to accrue at 10.5% annually. On
November 8, 1978, FAW, Ringwood, Francis, and Poggio executed a
new agreement that included most of the same terras as in the
promissory note, but also contained a merger provision. This
agreement prohibited Francis and Poggio from selling the stock
or assets of FAW without Ringwood*s prior written approval. By
October 1979, Francis and Poggio were delinquent in their
payments to Ringwood. Poggio then purchased all of Francis's
shares and became the sole owner.
On November 27, 1979, Poggio contracted to sell the FAW
stock to Gardner and Hernandez. The same parties executed a
new agreement on December 29, 1979, which excluded the sale of
FAW's real property. Both agreements included provisions for
full payment to Ringwood and specified 10.5% per annum interest
on amounts to be paid to Poggio.
On February 8, 1980, a new agreement was again executed
changing the transaction from a sale of FAW stock to a sale of
FAW's assets. No interest rate on the purchase price was
specified. Dinero Services, Inc«, (Dinero) a corporation
formed and owned by Hernandez and Gardner, was designated as
the sole buyer. This agreement did not contain any provision
for the buyer to assume Poggio*s obligation to Ringwood.
In April 1980, Poggio and Dinero Services, Inc. executed
their final agreement. This agreement was executed because a
condition precedent in the February contract had not occurred
and a dispute had arisen over the assets* value* It contained
an indemnity agreement that required Poggio to indemnify the
-seller* [sic] for any amounts Dinero might be required to pay
Ringwood, including attorney fees. Again, no interest rate was
set forth.
Ringwood had filed a prior lawsuit on January 29, 1980,
claiming Poggio and Francis had breached the October 1978
promissory note. Because Ringwood did not base his claim on
the November 8 agreement, which the court found controlling,
the court dismissed Ringwood's claim with prejudice. This

870540/541/544-CA
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decision was affirmed in Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc.,
671 P.2d 182 (Utah 1983),
Ringwood filed the complaint leading to this appeal on
February 4, 1985, basing his claim against Poggio and Francis
on the November 8 agreement* Ringwood included Gardner and
Hernandez as defendants, claiming he was a third party
beneficiary of their agreement with Poggio and that he was
damaged by their breach of that agreement. Ringwood claimed
Poggio and Francis failed to make payments required by the
November agreement; that they breached the agreement by selling
FAW's assets; and that they acted with malicious intent to
deprive Ringwood of his interests.
Poggio then filed a complaint against Gardner and Hernandez
for breach of their November 27, 1979 agreement. After the
court found the April 1980 agreement was controlling, Poggio
amended his complaint, basing his claims on the April agreement.
The court found that res judicata did not bar Ringwood and
that Poggio and Francis were liable to Ringwood for breach, but
that there was no malicious intent. The court also awarded
Poggio judgment against Hernandez and Gardner personally,
rather than against Dinero, with interest to accrue at the
legal rate, finding that the controlling contract did not
specify an interest rate. The court allocated expense and
income damages from April 14, 1980, the date of the closing,
instead of February, when Hernandez and Gardner took possession
Of FAW.
With respect to Ringwoodfs claims against Gardner and
Hernandez, the court found Ringwood was not a third party
beneficiary but only an incidental beneficiary under the
controlling agreement, and dismissed the claim with prejudice.
The trial court also found there was insufficient evidence to
find that Poggio or FAW was insolvent when the contract with
Hernandez and Gardner was entered into.
Ringwood appeals the court's finding that he is not a third
party beneficiary. He argues further that the April 14
agreement could not release Gardner and Hernandez from their
obligation to him.
Poggio appeals the court's ruling that Ringwood's claim was
not barred by res judicata and that interest would accrue on
his judgment against Gardner and Hernandez at the legal rate.
Also, with respect to the court's finding on allocation of
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income and expense damages, Poggio argues he should be liable
for those damages only to February 8, 1980/ when Gardner and
Hernadez took control of FAW, not April 14, 1980/ the closing
date specified in the last agreement.
Gardner and Hernandez claim the court erred in finding that
Poggio's amended complaint relates back to his original
complaint/ thus allowing Poggio to bring a claim six years
after the initial breach on August 8/ 1980/ after expiration of
the applicable statute of limitations.
The court denied Gardner and Hernandez attorney fees
because there was no showing of the necessity or reasonableness
of the fees requested. Gardner and Hernandez claim on appeal
that a showing of reasonableness is unnecessary under an
indemnity agreement.
RINGWOOD'S CLAIMS
Ringwood raises two arguments on appeal. First/ he claims
the court erred in finding he was not a third party
beneficiary# but only an incidental beneficiary of the contract
between Poggio and Gardner and Hernandez. Second, in related
arguments, Ringwood urges that Poggio1s release of Gardner and
Hernandez from their obligation to pay him was ineffective
because (1) he had vested rights by virtue of Gardner and
Hernandez's exercise of control over FAW, (2) Poggio was
insolvent at the time of the release/ and (3) there was not
fair consideration for the April agreement.
Third Party Beneficiary
The court found that Ringwood was an intended third party
beneficiary under the first two contracts between Poggio and
Gardner and Hernandez/ but that Ringwood did not rely upon/
assent to# nor file an action based on either of those
contracts prior to the time they were superceded by the
February and April 1980 agreements. The court further found
that Ringwood was intended to be an incidental beneficiary only
of the February 8/ 1980 and April 14/ 1980 agreements.
"Generally/ the rights of a third-party beneficiary are
determined by the intentions of the parties to the subject
contract." Tracv Collins Bank & Trust v. Dickamore, 652 P.2d
1314/ 1315 (Utah 1982). Moreover/ *[f]or a third-party
beneficiary to have a right to enforce a right, the intention
of the contracting parties to confer a separate and distinct
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benefit upon the third party must be clear.- Hansen v. Green
River Group, 748 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting
Rio Alaom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 506 (Utah 1980)).
An incidental beneficiary is defined as a Hperson who will be
benefited by the performance of a contract in which he is not a
promisee, but whose relation to the contracting parties is such
that the courts will not recognize any legal right in him.Schwinghammer v. Alexander, 21 Utah 2d 418, 446 P.2d 414, 415
(1968).
In this case, the contracts of November and December
expressly obligated Gardner and Hernandez to assume Poggio*s
obligation to Ringwood. However, these agreements were
superceded by the February agreement and ultimately by the
April agreement, both of which lacked any requirement that
Gardner and Hernandez assume the obligation to Ringwood, but
explicitly obligated Poggio to satisfy the obligation. Because
Gardner and Hernandez did not expressly assume the obligation
as they had in the earlier agreements, and because Poggio
expressly agreed to satisfy his obligation to Ringwood, it is
clear that the parties no longer intended Ringwood as a third
party beneficiary, Gardner and Hernandez have cited the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts for the proposition that
parties may modify duties to a third party beneficiary under
some circumstances, as follows:
(1) Discharge or modification of a
duty to an intended beneficiary by conduct
of the promisee or by a subsequent
agreement between promisor and promisee is
ineffective if a term of the promise
creating the duty so provides.
(2) In the absence of such a term, the
promisor and promisee retain power to
discharge or modify the duty by subsequent
agreement.
(3) Such a power terminates when the
beneficiary, before he receives
notification of the discharge or
modification, materially changes his
position in justifiable reliance on the
promise or brings suit on it or manifests
assent to it at the request of the
promisor or promisee.
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Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 311 (1981) (emphasis
added). Although no Utah cases have expressly adopted this
language, we find it applicable to the facts of this case. As
found by the trial court, Ringwood did not rely upon nor change
his position because of the rights as a third party beneficiary
afforded him in the first two contracts, nor did he file an
action based on those rights. Therefore, the parties were free
to terminate Ringwood's rights in the later, superceding
contracts. The April agreement clearly does not give Ringwood
third party beneficiary status. As a result, the trial court
did not err in concluding Ringwood was not a third party
beneficiary to the April agreement.
Fraudulent Release
Ringwood also argues that the rescission of his rights
under the earlier agreements was fraudulent and, therefore/
invalid, because Poggio did not receive fair consideration for
the release and because Poggio was insolvent. To support his
contention, Ringwood primarily relies on the Second Restatement
on Contracts, which states, Ma promise for the benefit of a
creditor of the promisee is an asset of the promisee. A
release of the promisor may be a fraud on the beneficiary or on
other creditors of the promisee if the promisee is insolvent
and the release is made without fair consideration . . . ."
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 311 comment i (1981).
The court's findings state that there was insufficient
evidence to find that either Poggio or FAW was insolvent. The
court also found that there was fair consideration for the
April 1980 agreement. We review the trial court1s findings in
accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a), and will not reverse
unless the findings are clearly erroneous.
Evidence was presented as to Poggio's debts, including tax
debts and the amounts owed to Ringwood. However, no evidence
was admitted concerning the value of FAW, retained by Poggio
under the agreements, nor of the Fiat franchise, which he
retained until 1982. Poggio also testified that he owned a
painting, valued in excess of $100,000. No competent evidence
was presented to invalidate that valuation. We find sufficient
evidence to support the court's finding that Poggio's
insolvency was not established. Similarly, the court's finding
of fair consideration for the April 1980 agreement is supported
by Poggio's testimony regarding amounts he was to receive under
the agreement and as reflected in the agreement itself.
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Finally, Ringwood cites Bracklein v. Realty Ins. Co., 95
Utah 490, 80 P.2d 471 (1938) to support his novel theory that
he had a vested third party interest because of Gardner and
Hernandez's exercise of dominion and control over FAW's
assets. Bracklein, however, concerns a grantee of mortgaged
property who was in privity of contract with the mortgagee
through an assumption clause. Ringwood was not in privity with
Gardner and Hernandez and, therefore, Bracklein is
inapplicable. Also, Gardner and Hernandez took possession of
FAW after the February agreement was executed and after
Ringwood's third party beneficiary rights had been
extinguished. Therefore, Ringwood is not restored to third
party rights by use of this theory.
POGGIO'S CLAIMS
On appeal, Poggio claims that the trial court erred (1) by
concluding that Ringwood*s claims against him under the
November 1978 agreement were not barred by res judicata; (2) in
ruling that the legal rate of interest applied to the amount
owed him by Gardner and Hernandez; and (3) allocating costs and
expenses from the date of closing rather than from when Gardner
and Hernandez took over FAW„
Res Judicata
Poggio claims the court incorrectly concluded that the
doctrine of res judicata did not operate to preclude Ringwood's
second complaint against him. Prior to analyzing the
applicability of res judicata, however, we consider an
evidentiary question raised by Ringwood. Ringwood asserts that
there was no evidentiary basis for a determination that res
judicata barred his action, because no evidence was offered or
admitted as to the prior proceeding. We have examined the
record, and determined that there are no exhibits in the trial
court proceedings consisting of records of the prior
litigation, nor were any requests for judicial notice of those
proceedings made on the record.
Ringwood cites the case of Parrish v. Lavton Citv Corp.,
542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975) as supporting his position. In
Parrish, defendant claimed that plaintiffs action was barred
by res judicata because a prior similar action had been
dismissed. The trial court's grant of summary judgment to
defendant was reversed by the Utah Supreme Court, stating that
"[a] survey of the record reveals that defendant never
submitted a copy of the pleadings and judgment" from the prior
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action. Id., at 1087. The court found that M[s]ince the record
of the prior action was not before the trial court/ there is no
basis to sustain the determination that plaintiff's claim was
barred by the doctrine of res judicata.- Id.
Application of Parrish was addressed by this court in
Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988)# cert, denied, 769 P.2d 819 (Utah 1988). In a
prior action, Trimble had sued Fitzgerald/ a buyer# for a real
estate commission. The trial court found against him and the
supreme court affirmed the decision. Trimble then brought a
second action for the same commission against Monte Vista
Ranch/ seller of the property/ which raised the defense of res
judicata. The trial court dismissed the action on the basis of
res judicata and Trimble appealed. On appeal/ Trimble, relying
on Parrish, asked for reversal because the trial court did not
have before it the records of the prior proceeding/ but only
the supreme court decision, which was attached to a memorandum
in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment. The
Trimble court found Parrish distinguishable, noting that in
Parrish, the trial court had no record at all of the prior
proceeding, and thus Hhad absolutely no basis for determining
the res judicata issue.- I&. at 455. The court further found
that Trimble had consented to the trial court's reliance on the
opinion and that
once Monte Vista submitted to the district
court a copy of the Supreme Court opinion,
which on its face showed that the key
issue had been litigated and decided, the
burden shifted to Trimble, if it believed
more than the opinion was needed to make a
fully informed decision, to produce the
record of the prior proceeding/ urge the
court to take judicial notice of it/ or
otherwise show that the opinion should not
be taken at face value.
I&. Trimble/ however/ had not taken any of those actions but
had merely argued the meaning of the opinion in the prior
action. Id. As a result/ this court held that Trimble
consented to the trial court's use of the opinion alone as a
basis for its ruling. In addition, the trial court was able to
infer from the opinion what had been adjudicated in the prior
action and conclude that the present action was barred by
collateral estoppel. Id.
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In this case, from our reading of the record, it is not
clear whether or not the trial court actually examined the
trial court proceedings in the former action,1 It is clear,
however, that the trial court examined the supreme court
opinion. Not only was it referred to in some detail in
memoranda and motions of counsel, but was also detailed in the
court's rulings, which demonstrate the court's familiarity with
the opinion. Throughout the course of the trial court
proceedings, counsel and the court referred to and argued the
meaning of the supreme court opinion in the context of the res
judicata claim. At no point did Ringwood object to reliance on
the opinion or move for admission of the former action's trial
court proceedings. Therefore, as in Trimble, there was no
error in utilizing the opinion only to determine the
applicability of res judicata.
The next question is whether there needed to be explicit
admission of the opinion into evidence or taking of judicial
notice.2 Judicial notice serves as a substitute for the
taking of evidence. 29 Am. Jur.2d Evidence § 14 (1967).
Therefore, since the opinion was not admitted into evidence, it
is sufficient if judicial notice was taken. Pursuant to Utah
R. Evid. 201(c), the court has discretion to take judicial
notice without request by counsel. In this case, the trial
court reserved ruling on the res judicata issue until after the
supreme court opinion was issued. Thereafter, it referred to
the opinion in detail when rendering its decision and the
findings of fact and conclusions of law entered include
particulars from the opinion. It is clear that the trial court
had carefully read the opinion and ruled on the res judicata
issue on the basis of its interpretation of the opinion, with
no objection by the parties. We, therefore, conclude that the
court took judicial notice of the opinion and utilized the

1. There are, however, indications that the court may have
examined the proceedings. For example, the court said it
wanted to look at the file of the former action when the
supreme court was through with it, and at one point, counsel
for Poggio stated he had the summons and complaint from the
former action.
2. Trimble does not address this question, although it appears
that the supreme court opinion was neither admitted as evidence
nor afforded official judicial notice on the record.
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opinion as the evidentiary basis for its decision on the issue
of res judicata.3
We now turn to the question of whether the trial court
correctly concluded that Ringwood's claim under the November 8
agreement against Poggio was not barred by res judicata. Claim
preclusion is a branch of the doctrine of res judicata which
has three requirements for its application:
First/ both cases must involve the same
parties or their privies. Second/ the
claim that is alleged to be barred must
have been presented in the first suit or
must be one that could and should have
been raised in the first action. Third/
the first suit must have resulted in a
final judgment on the merits,
Madsen v. Borthwick, 769 P.2d 245/ 247 (Utah 1988),. Therefore,
the result in the prior action-constitutes the full relief
available to the parties on the same claim or cause of action.
Trimble, 758 P.2d at 453. In contrast to the claim preclusion
branch of res judicata, issue preclusion, or collateral
estoppel, requires that the issue in question was competently,
fully, and fairly litigated in the earlier action. Copper
State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah Ct. App.
1987) . Claim preclusion applicability/ however# requires that
the claim/ even though not decided in the prior action, could
and should have been litigated/ but was not raised by any of
the parties. See Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528 (Utah
1981). This -reflects the expectation that parties who are
given the capacity to present their 'entire controversies'
shall in fact do so." Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24
comment a (1982).
The findings of the trial court in this case indicate that/
in the prior action, the trial court ruled that the October
promissory note merged into the November 8 agreement and that
ruling was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. The trial court
herein concluded that the prior decision was "not a decision on

3. We note, however, as does Trimble, that it would be
preferable for counsel to have provided a copy of the trial
court proceedings and the supreme court opinion, and either had
them admitted as exhibits or requested judicial notice.
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the merits of Ringwood's claims for the sale of his stock and
such decision is not res judicata so as to preclude Ringwood
from pursuing claims under the Agreement oE November 8, 1979."
We do not defer to the trial court's conclusions of law, and in
this case, find that the court erred in concluding that res
judicata did not bar Ringwood's claim against Poggio. Both the
October promissory note and the November agreement concerned
Poggio's purchase of Ringwoodfs stock.4 The court in the
prior action determined that the October note was nullified by
merger into the November agreement so that Ringwood could not
assert a claim under the October note. Since Ringwood failed
to assert a claim under the November agreement either initially
or by amendment to his complaint, the case was properly
dismissed. Obviously, a claim by Ringwood under the November
agreement could have been decided in the prior action, as the
agreement was extant and was in default. The only reason it
was not decided was because Ringwood failed to raise the
claim. The trial court apparently held that res judicata did
not apply because Ringwood's claim for payment for his stock
under the November agreement was not litigated. However, the
reason the claim was not litigated was solely because of
Ringwood's failure to assert the claim. The other requirements
of res judicata are also met, as the parties are the same and
the first action resulted in a final judgment on the
merits.5 Therefore, we find that res judicata bars
Ringwood's claims against Poggio and Francis, and reverse the
judgment granted Ringwood.
Legal Rate of Interest
Poggio appeals the court's application of the then legal
rate of interest, 6%, to the balance of the purchase price owed
by Gardner and Hernandez. Poggio admits that the April
agreement is silent on the interest rate, but contends,
4. The supreme court opinion states: "In 1978, Mr. Ringwood
and FAW agreed with the defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Poggio and Mr.
Francis, that the defendants would purchase Ringwood's shares
for $100,000, and the defendants signed a promissory note in
October, 1978 for that amount. Subsequently, on November 8,
1978 the parties entered into a written agreement for the sale
and purchase of the stock." Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works,
Inc., 671 P.2d 182, 182 (Utah 1983).
5. The fact that the prior action was dismissed with prejudice
does not nullify res judicata application, as such constitutes
litigation on the merits. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Steiner v.
State, 27 Utah 2d 284, 495 P-2d 809 (1972).

however, the interest rate should be inferred to be 10.5% as
was specified in the previous agreements that were superceded.
Poggio presented no evidence at trial of an intent to
incorporate a 10.5% interest rate into the April agreement.
The court found that the parties intended the April agreement
to supercede and replace all prior agreements. We defer to the
trial court's findings as to the parties* intentions.
Seashores Inc. v. Hancey, 738 P.2d 645, 647 (Utah Ct. App.
1987). The court's finding is supported by substantial
evidence. Furthermore/ the prior agreements merged into the
April agreement which clearly does not specify an interest
rate. Utah law provides that the legal rate is applicable in
instances where the parties have not agreed on a specified
rate. Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (1986). We, therefore, conclude
that the court did not err in awarding interest at the legal
rate on Poggiofs judgment against Gardner and Hernandez.
Allocation of Income and Expense Liability
Lastly, Poggio appeals the trial court's allocation of
income and expense damages as of the date of closing rather
than the earlier date when Gardner and Hernandez took
possession of FAW. This issue was not raised in the trial
court and, hence, cannot be considered for the first time on
appeal. Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320, 1322-23 (Utah 1982);
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
GARDNER AND HERNANDEZ'S CLAIMS
Gardner and Hernandez contend the trial court erred (1) by
finding them personally liable under the April agreement; (2)
in ruling that Poggio*s amended complaint related back to his
original complaint; (3) in its calculation of the amount owed
by them to Poggio; and (4) in denying them attorney fees.
Personal Liability
Gardner and Hernandez appeal the trial court"s conclusion
that they are personally liable under the April agreement.
They argue that the court ignored the corporate form without
finding Dinero was their alter ego and, consequently,
unjustifiably pierced the corporate veil.
The corporate form protects shareholders from personal
liability and will be pierced by the courts with great
reluctance and caution. Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786
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(Utah Ct. App. 1987)•
entity,

In order to disregard the corporate

two circumstances must be shown: (1) such
a unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the corporation
and the individual no longer exist, but
the corporation is, instead, the alter-ego
of one or a few individuals; and (2) if
observed, the corporate form would
sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or
result in an inequity.
Id. See also Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. James Constructors, 761
P.2d 42, 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). One of the factors deemed
significant in determining whether this test has been met is
the use of the corporation as a facade for operations of the
dominant stockholder. Colman, 743 P.2d at 786. ^At the
beginning of trial, the court stated that Gardner and Hernandez
were personally liable under the April agreement and the trial
proceeded with that ruling in place.(( The court found that
Gardner and Hernandez were the real parties in interest, that
they
were intended as parties to the agreement, and that
M
Dinero Services Inc. was not considered by the parties as an
operative entity as far as the dealings between the parties
were concerned." These findings are supported by the evidence,
especially considering the history of transactions in this
matter, and meet the required legal criteria for piercing the
corporate veil. Therefore, the court did not err in holding
Gardner and Hernandez personally liable to Poggio under the
April agreement.
Relation Back
Gardner and Hernandez appeal the court's conclusion that
Poggio's amendment to the complaint, filed on October 16, 1986,
relates back to his original complaint, filed on May 3, 1982,
and was, thus, not barred by the statute of limitations.
Poggio's last amended complaint was for the purpose of basing
his claim against Gardner and Hernandez on the April
agreement. Gardner and Hernandez argue that the earlier
pleadings did not place them on notice that Poggio would base
his action for breach of contract on the April agreement.
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a), leave to amend pleadings
"shall be freely given when justice so requires.- Utah R. Civ.
P. 15(c) states, M[w]henever the claim or defense asserted in
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the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence, set forth or attempted to be set forth in the
original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of
the original pleading.- Relation back is allowed under the
rules even if a statute of limitations has run during the
intervening time. Mevers v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 879
(Utah 1981). In considering motions to amend pleadings,
primary considerations are whether parties have adequate notice
to meet new issues and whether any party receives an unfair
advantage or disadvantage. Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 98
(Utah 1981). See also Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 761 P.2d
581, 587 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
In this case, Poggio's claim in his amended complaint is
based on essentially the same transaction as was the original
complaint: the purchase of FAW and/or its assets by Gardner
and Hernandez and their alleged failure to perform under the
operative contract between the parties. In addition, Gardner
and Hernandez asserted repeatedly in the trial court
proceedings, that the agreements under which Poggio had
previously sought to recover had been superceded and filed a
memorandum in support of a motion for partial summary judgment
against Poggio, arguing the April agreement was controlling.
This memorandum was filed three months before Poggio filed his
amendment. Because the amendment was based on a similar claim
arising out of the same general transaction, and because
Gardner and Hernandez were aware, within the period of the
statute, that the April agreement was superceding, Gardner and
Hernandez had adequate notice of the claim and were not
prejudiced by the amendment. The subject matter of the April
agreement arose from the same basic dealings as the prior
agreements between the same parties and the amendment alleging
breach of the April agreement related back to the original
filing and was not barred by the statute of limitations.
Therefore, the court did not err in concluding that the
amendment related back.
Amount of Liability to Poggio
Gardner and Hernandez claim the court erred in determining
the amount owed Poggio. Specifically, they claim the court
erred in calculating the amount they actually paid under the
April agreement. Gardner testified that he actually overpaid
approximately $12,000. To the contrary, Poggio testified that
there was still an outstanding balance. Based on this
testimony and other evidence, the court granted judgment to
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Poggio for $20,330.27, as the balance owed on the purchase price,
"Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. . . ."
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Particularly, the court's award of
damages will be affirmed on appeal, Hif there is a reasonable
basis in evidenceH to support it. Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d
499, 500 (Utah 1976); Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461, 462 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988);
Katzenbach v. State, 735 P.2d 405, 409 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Moreover, M[t]he trial court as a trier of fact is free to assess
the credibility of the witnesses, and a conflict in evidence
alone is not grounds for reversal. We will not upset findings,
so long as they are supported by substantial record evidence."
Chandler v. Mathews, 734 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah 1987). Although
evidence of the amount actually paid was conflicting, the trial
court's finding is based on substantial evidence and is not
clearly erroneous.
Attorney Fees
Finally, Gardner and Hernandez appeal the court's denial of
attorney fees. The April agreement provided that Poggio would
indemnify Dinero Hfrom any and all claims and loss . . .
including attoneys' fees" arising from claims made by Ringwood.
Gardner's testimony that $6500 in attorney fees had been paid to
defend against Ringwood*s claims was the sole evidence offered to
support the claim for pttorney fees. The trial court denied the
request for fees on the basis that there was no evidence
presented to show that the fees were reasonable or necessary, or
the nature of the work done. Gardner and Hernandez argue such
evidence is unnecessary because the request is made pursuant to
an indemnity agreement and not an attorney fees clause. To
support this argument, they cite Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage &
Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d 1059 (Alaska.1978). However, in Heritage,
the Alaska Supreme Court found attorney fees were recoverable as
falling within an implied right of indemnification clause, but
did not hold that there was no requirement of a showing that the
fees were reasonable. We see no basis for distinguishing a
request for attorney fees under an indemnity provision from a
request under an attorney fee provision. MAttorney fees awarded
pursuant to contract or statute are usually those found by the
court to be 'reasonable,' unless the statute or contract provides
otherwise." Canvon Country Store v. Bracev, 781 P.2d 414, 420
(Utah 1989). Furthermore, "[i]t is well established that to
justify a finding of a reasonable attorney's fee, there must be
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evidence in support of that finding, . . . It is beyond
dispute that an evidentiary basis is a fundamental requirement
for establishing an award of attorney fees,- Barnes v. Wood,
750 P.2d 1226, 1233 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Paul Mueller
Co. v. Cache Vallev Dairy Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1279, 1287 (Utah
1982)). The trial court was, therefore, correct in denying the
request because there was no showing the fees requested were
reasonable.
Affirmed in part, and reversed as to the judgment entered
of Ringwood against Pqqqio.
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Defendants and Respondents,
Massimo M Max M Poggio and Foreign
Auto Works, Inc.
Plaintiffs,
v.
Hugh Gardner and Anthony R,
Hernandez
Defendants,
Richard W. Ri ngwood,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Foreign Auto Works, Inc. et al.,
Defendant s and Appellants.
Massimo "Max" Poggio and Foreign
Auto Works, I nc.
Plaintiff s and Appellants,
v.
Hugh Gardner and Anthony R.
Hernandez
Defendant s and Respondents.
Richard W. Ri ngwood,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

%
t.J

^..

No. 870540-CA

No. 870541-CA

No. 870544-CA
Foreign Auto Works, Inc. et al.,
Defendant s and Respondents.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for
Rehearing be denied.
Dated this pf1^^
FOR THE COURT:

'muQc
j~

Mary T/ Noonan,

Clerk

day of January 1990.

